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Policymaking Under Pressure:
The Perils of Incremental Responses
to Climate Change
CARY COGLIANESE" & JOCELYN D'AMBROSIO....
In Notes from a Climate Change Pressure Cooker, Cinnamon Carlarne
chronicles a series of recent American legal decisions and policy
developments responding to global climate change, many of them arising
at the state level. 1 Carlarne, like others, treats these incremental
developments as commendable, at least insofar as they provide stepping
stones to a comprehensive national response? This positive posture is
certainly understandable. After all, when faced with potentially
catastrophic consequences from global warming, surely it would seem that
some action is better than no action at all. It has even been suggested
recently that, when it comes to addressing climate change, "smaller
environmental contracts, deals, and ad hoc arrangements may do more
good" than waiting to forge comprehensive national or international
solutions.3 Carlarne's work therefore raises an important question: Should
citizens and policymakers laud the blooming of climate change policy
"flowers" across the land? In other· words, should they support these and
other similar incremental policy efforts to respond to climate change, at
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1 Cinnamon Carlarne, Notes from a Climate Change Pressure-Cooker: Sub-Federal Attempts at
Transformation Meet National Resistance in the USA, 40 CONN. L. REv. 1351 (2008).
2 See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Harmonizing Regulatory and Litigation Approaches to Climate
Change Mitigation: Incorporating Tradable Emissions Offsets into Common Law Remedies, 155 U. PA.
L. REv. 1563, 1564 (2007) ("Both [state climate change regulation and state-initiated litigation] can
function as an intermediate step between no regulation and a federal PIOg:t81Il.");·Edna Sussman,
Reshaping Municipal and County Laws To Foster Green Building, Energy Efficiency, and Renewable
Energy, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 1, 3 (2008) ("Actions taken by local governments can provide an
important step towards conquering global warming and provide a necessary supplement to any federal
or state measures.").
3 Eric W. Orts, Closing Statement, in Debate: Collaborative Environmental Law: Pro and Con,
156 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 289, 300, 304-05 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.comldeblites/pdfsl
collabenvlaw.pdf; see also BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING
POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLlCY, at xi-xii (2004) ("American states have enacted
multiple policies that show considerable promise of reducing greenhouse gases."); Id. at 27 ("[S]tates
may be unusually well equipped to fashion reduction strategies that make sense, given their particular
mix of economic and governance realities and the fact that no government or private entity has
mastered 'how to do' climate change policy.").
least until a coalition can be forged to secure a more comprehensive
strategy?
An affirmative answer nas no doubt garnered considerable support
given the urgency of the· health, environmental, and welfare concerns
created by climate change. It also finds. support in political science
accounts of policYmaking and in recent arguments in favor of democratic
experimentalism. In his classic work on political decisionmaking, for
example, political scientist Charles Lindblom argued that policymaking
inevitably proceeds incrementally.4 More recently, scholars have
celebrated decentralized, self-consciously incremental approaches to
environmental problems, arguing that they result in more legitimate,
innovative, and effective solutions.s Both of these streams of scholarship
imply that immediate, albeit incremental and decentralized, policies on
climate change will necessarily be better than waiting to develop, analyze,
and build political support for a comprehensive policy strategy for climate
change.6
We disagree. Whatever the merits of decentralized experimentalism in
other contexts, it is not well-suited for reducing global emissions of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases [GROs].? Perhaps not all global
problems require a comprehensive, global solution-but reversing the
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4 Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 79, 84
(1959).
5 See, e.g., DANIEL 1. FIORINO, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 221 (2006) (arguing that
"an incremental but conceptual and learning-based strategy for change offers the best alternative for
speeding up the transition to a new environmental regulation"); DEWIT[ JOHN, CIVIC
ENVIRONMENTALISM: ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES 272 (1994)
(arguing that states hold the advantage of being better able "to customize their policies to local
circumstances, to engage citizens and organizations, and to span interagency and professional
boundaries"); David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It's Timefor a NeW Look to Our "Laboratories
ofDemocracy" in the Effort To Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REv.
347, 355 (1994) (lauding "the existence of fifty state governments" which "inherently creates both
numerous 'innovation centers' and the opportunity to try a wide variety of 'approaches simultaneously.
or within short periods oftime"); Charles Sabel et aI., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, in BEYOND .
BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM 3, 9 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2000) (proposing a new
system of environmental regulation that takes advantage of lo£al autonom)l as. an alternative to "the
notorious inflexibility of centralized command systems"); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of
Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 21, 133-;34 (2001) (noting proponents' argument that
"any solution to current concerns with the O.S. environmental regulatory system is likely to be and is
best served by an incremental approach").
6 The Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA employs this line of reasoning, See
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1457 (2007) ("Agencies, like legislatures, do not generally
resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop.... They instead whittle away at them over
time, refining their preferred approach as circumstanoes change and as they develop a more-nuanced
understanding of how best to proceed." (citation omitted».
7 Cf Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 570, 625-26
(1996) (noting that despite the advantages of decentralization "global concerns such as ozone layer
depletion and possible climate change due to the accumulation of greenhouse gases" give rise to
"transboundary harm [that] demands some form of overarching governmental action across the scope
of the harm").
2008] POLICYMAKING UNDER PRESSURE 1415
trajectory and effects of GHG emissions most assuredly does.8
Contemporary policy developments like those described by Carlame, as
well as those occurring elsewhere in the world, raise the potential of
hidden perils as much as they hold out promise of incremental or eventual
improvement. Rather than signifying valuable policy progress, or even
serving as potential stepping stones toward a more comprehensive solution,
existing piecemeal state, federal, and even regional climate change policies
pose nontrivial risks of policy failure.9 In some cases, the policies
themselves could lead to problems at least as severe as the ones the
policies originally aimed to solve.
In this article, we elaborate on the problems associated with
incremental policYmaking as applied to climate change. Specifically, we
focus attention on six types of problems that we label: (1) Non-effects;
(2) Leakage; (3) Climate Side Effects; (4) Other Side Effects; (5) Lock-in;
and (6) Lulling. Our aim in chronicling the perils of incrementalism is not
to argue against taking meaningful and appropriate policy action to address
climate change; rather it is to temper the impulse to act with a frank
elicitation of the perils of acting impulsively. Citizens and policYmakers
should not confuse the pace of action with its ultimate wisdom. Some of
the uncoordinated policy developments taking place now, under the
pressure for action, may well be worse than making no legal change at aU
until a well-considered and comprehensive global (or at least national)
strategy on climate change can be forged.
1. THE PROMISE OF INCREMENTALISM
In his celebrated conception of incremental policYmaking, Charles
Lindblom explained that because decisionmakers act without perfect
information, policYmaking tends to proceed via a series of iterative
adjustments. 1O PolicYmakers, in other words, move in small steps based on
8 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The. I.imits of LDeal Climate.
Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1961, 1962 (2007) ("[L]ocal action is not well suited to regulating mobile
global conduct yielding a global externality."); Jason Scott Johnston, Climate Change Hysteria and the
Supreme Court: On the Likely Economic Consequences of Global Warming for America and the
Adverse Impacts and Ineffectiveness of Regulating Greenhouse Gases under the Clean Air Act 1-2
(Reg-Mkts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 08-06, 2008), available at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/
authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fuame=..Ipdffiles/WP08-06_topost.pdf (reasoning that because of the
global nature of climate change, even a unilateral national response is unlikely to mitigate climate
change).
9 Cf Jonathan Baert Wiener, Designing Global Climate Regulation, in CLIMATE CHANGE
POLICY: A SURVEY 151, 151 (Stephen H. Schneider et al. eds., 2002) ("Climate change is complex on
many dimensions, frustrating simple and hasty regulatory responses."); Victor B. Flatt, Taking the
Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Legislative Proposal is "Best"?, 102 Nw. U.
L. REv. COLLOQUY 123, 150 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/32/
LRCol12007n32Flatt.pdf ("Climate change legislation is complex ... and without examining all of the
issues together, incorrect choices will be made.").
10 See Lindblom, supra note 4, at 84 (explaining that limits on both available information and
cognitive ability cause policymakers to approach problem solving systematically); see also CHARLES E.
LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 314 (1977)
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accessible knowledge. Lindblom offered the incremental model to contrast
with the rational-comprehensive or synoptic model, in which policy begins
with policymakers stating their values and goals, identifying all possible
means of achieving these goals,. and systematically comparing the
alternatives to arrive at an approach that maximizes intended values. fl
Incrementalism is attractive because of the difficulties of synoptic
policy analysis.12 Rather than urging policymakers to attempt to consider
and respond to all issues comprehensively, incrementalists prefer that
policymakers exclude some considerations from their analysis and take
action before they can assess fully the possible consequences. This method
relies on new information derived from policy experiments ("trial and
error") to help public policy evolve over time. Experimentation can thus
also generate and illuminate solutions that may not have even been known
when the policy was proposed.13 The ability to learn from each round of
experiments is viewed as one of the primary·benefits of incrementalism. In
this way, incrementalism also provides a type of insurance against large-
scale policy disaster. If problems are addressed bit by bit, and if solutions
can be modified over time, the negative consequences of policy mistakes
will be neither extensive nor long-lived.
Incrementalism embraces two distinct types of policy variation and
change. First, policies can be spatially incremental, in much the way
Carlarne describes. 14 Ad hoc state and local experiments are incremental
because the limited jurisdiction to which they apply ensures they can never
be more than a step toward more synoptic, encompassing policies for
problems that cross jurisdictional boundaries. Second, policies can be
focally incremental if they focus on only part of what causes a. p.olicy
problem. In this way, even jurisdictionally large policies (that is, those
adopted at the national or international level) can be incremental if their
focus is constrained. For example, adopting a national motor vehicle
emissions standard to address climate change would be more spatially
comprehensive than any of the policies discussed by Carlarne, in that it
would apply to vehicles across the country; however, such a policy would
still be focally incremental because automobiles are only one source of
("Since people cannot intellectually master all their social problems ... they depend on various devices
to simplify problem solving.").
11 See Lindblom, supra note 4, at 79 (proposing alternate ways to formulate policy).
12 Incrementalists argue that in approaching any policy, there are barriers to a comprehensive
understanding. These barriers to synopsis include: (I) policy problems which by their very nature tend
to escape complete cognition; (2) policies that often cannot~effectivelycompared because there is no
set of agreed upon criteria upon which we judge all policies; and (3) problem solvers who naturally
tend toward non-synoptic techniques, such as excluding certain value considerations to reach a result.
LINDBLOM, supra note 10, at 322.
13 !d. at 257-58,316.
14 See Carlame, supra note I, at 1381 (describing "[t]he flood of independent and collaborative
climate change law and policy-making activities taking place at the state and local level" and
acknowledging that these state and local measures are not "comprehensive, robust regulatory structures
for climate change").
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greenhouse gas emissions. IS
Proponents of democratic experimentalism encourage both of these
types of incremental policies. Because they favor giving discretion to local
entities to set, and experiment with, their own standards, the policies
emanating from democratic experimentalism are spatially incremental. I6
Democratic experimentalism "replaces central command regulation with a
combination of local experimentation and centralized pooling of
experience.,,17 National policymakers compile information and help
diffuse innovations, but locals choose their own performance targets and
means of redress. This means that many experimentalist policies will also
be focally incremental.
Both democratic experimentalists and incrementalists favor local
knowledge and learning by trial and error, even for some of the largest
scale problems such as climate change.18 As such, intellectual enthusiasm
for incremental policymaking appears fused, for the moment at least, with
the current piecemeal policy trajectory with respect to climate change.
Many climate change innovations are being pursued in ways that are either
spatially or focally incremental--or both.
15 In addition to spatial and focal incrementalism, there is a third, temporal dimension to
incrementalism. The IPCC appears to have had this temporal dimension in mind when, in its fourth
report, it explained that "[r]esponding to climate change involves an iterative risk management process
that includes both mitigation and adaptation." INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REpORT 64 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assess
ment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (emphasis added). To some extent, temporal incrementalism can be
said simply to grow out of the recognition that, in principle, policies always can be modified. When
doing so would correct policy failures or otherwise improve overall outcomes for society, policy
changes should be made. In some cases, temporal incrementalism might even support the use of sunset
provisions as part of new policies, so as to require renewed attention and re-analysis by policymakers at
designated intervals if policies are to remain in effect. However, as our discussion of the pitfalls of
incrementalism in the next part of this article should make clear, we think a strong version of temporal
incrementalism that favors quicker decision-making over more labored attempts at synopticism, and
that relies on the inherent opportunity to modify policy as part of the justification for making quicker
(and potentially more error-prone) decisions, represents a fundamentally misguided approach to the
problems associated with climate change. Such a strong version of temporal incrementalism, which
Lindblom advocated, also dovetails with the case for both spatial and focal incrementalism that we
highlight in the text, since it is usually easier and quicker to make decisions that affect smaller domains
(or fewer actors) or that implicate only part of a larger, more complex problem.
16 See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998) (envisioning a system in which power is
decentralized, allowing citizens and local organizations the opportunity to fashion solutions to societal
problems based on their individual circumstances); Sabel et aI., Srtf7"U note 5, at 6-8 (envisioning a
"rolling rule" framework that would replace regulation based on central commands, with a combination
of local experimentation and centralized pooling ofexperience).
17 Sabel et aI., supra note 5, at 7.
18 See, e.g., id. at 14-15 (noting that under the authors' proposed rolling-rule regime the local
actors that implement policies are able to conduct monitored experiments that help shape responses to
larger, more diffuse problems); Orts, supra note 3, at 304-05 (stating that "global climate change
provides an example of why scholars and policymakers should not bind themselves too closely to
traditional lawmaking" and urging that "smaller environmental contracts, deals, and ad hoc
arrangements may do more good in this context").
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This current path is not as promising as incrementalists or
experimentalists might lead us to believe. While incrementalism may well
be appropriate for many important public problems, it does not necessarily
work for all problems. 19 Some problems require more than can be
achieved with successive small steps, or simply cannot be divided into
small steps that produce a meaningful result.m Sometimes nothing short of
a large-scale, focally comprehensive policy will do.
Climate change appears to fall into this category. Not only might it be
impossible to solve the climate change problem through incremental steps,
but when policYmakers proceed incrementally~ they do so with a degree of
peril.21 Rather than providing insurance against catastrophic
consequences, incremental approaches to climate change could either
contribute to or fail to prevent catastrophic consequences altogether.
Consider the following six perils of incremental climate change
policYmaking.
A. Non-effect
Incremental state and federal policies are unlikely to reverse climate
change. Even in the aggregate, their limited scope and focus can make it
difficult, if not impossible, to produce large improvements in this global
problem. State and local programs may change behavior within their
jurisdiction, but unabated rates of emissions growth from other areas can
cancel out even seemingly significant effects within a single jurisdiction.
Greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere for years, making the
problem bound to continue unless there are widespread, coordinated
reductions throughout the world.22
Even national-scale programs that have a narrow focus, such as the
recently revamped Renewable Fuel Standard [RFS],23 are unlikely to have
19 For a critique of incremental policymaking, see Paul R. Schulman, Nonincremental Policy
Making: Notes Toward an Alternative Paradigm, 69 AM. POL. Sel. REv. 1354, 1354-67 {1975}, which
contends that for some policies, including large-scale undertakings in response to major problems, the
incrementalist approach of successive limited comparisons is inadequate.
20Id.
21 Cf Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 RISK:
HEALTH, SAFETY & ENVT. 39, 70-71 (1998) (pointing to the folly of Lindblom's incrementalist
approach in the context of risk regulation).
22 See Pierre Friedlingstein, A Steep Road to Cti"mate Stabilization, 451 NATURE 297; 297-98
(2008), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/joumaVv451/n7176/pdf/nature06593.pdf
(explaining the difficulty of stabilizing atmospheric OHO concentrations because as air concentrations
decrease land and ocean ecosystems might actually absorb fewer emissions, thus requiring still greater
emissions reductions).
23 See Energy Independence and Security Act of2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 202(a)(2), 121 Stat.
1142, 1521-23 (2007) (increasing the previously enacted renewable fuels mandate to require thirty-six
billion gallons of renewable fuels, twenty-one billion gallons of advanced biofuels, and sixteen billion
gallons of cellulosic biofuel by 2022). For more information on the Renewable Fuel Standard and
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much of an effect on climate change in the absence of more global reform.
Although vehicle emissions do constitute a large portion of the emissions
that cause climate change, because of the confluence of factors that
contribute to climate change, limiting this one source of emissions is not
likely to be sufficient. Thus by definition, the limited scope of focally as
well as spatially incremental policies make it unlikely that they will be able
to put a dent in the emissions reductions necessary to reverse global
warmmg.
B. Leakage
Not only is it likely that incremental policies will do little or nothing to
affect global warming, but certain incremental policies, including state-
level efforts like the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative [RGGI],24 might
also worsen the global climate change problem because of leakage from
other jurisdictions.25 By "leakage," we mean to refer to situations where a
stringent climate change policy unintentionally induces an increase in
emissions in another jurisdiction with a less stringent or nonexistent policy.
Leakage can occur for a number of reasons.26 For example; if" the
supply of energy is restricted via regulation, the price of goods and
services will increase, sparking an increase in supply from non-regulated
sources. This supply-style leakage could be a concern for RGGI as it is
possible that non-RGGI states will increase production and export "dirtier"
energy to RGGI states. Some estimates indicate that leakage due to
increased imports from other states could offset as much as sixty to ninety
percent of RGGI-related reductions, substantially undermining the-
initiative's objectives?7
Leakage can also occur if incremental regulations greatly increase the
cost of production in some states or regions. Facing such a cost increase,
subsequent EPA regulations, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Renewable Fuel Standard
Program, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/renewablefuels/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
24 Carlarne, supra note 1, at 1371 (elaborating on the benefits of regional initiatives, including
their ability to take advantage of economies of scale, create a more unified response,and place more
pressure on other states and the federal government).
25 See, e.g., The Magnificent Seven: States Take the Lead on Global Warming, ACEEE's
GRAPEVINE ONLINE, Jan. 17. 2006, http://www.aceee.org/aboutJ06Olrggi.btm Ehereinafter The
Magnificent Seven] (noting model results indicating that leakage could offset sixty to ninety percent of
RGGI's carbon reductions); see also Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Pol'y Solutions, Northeast Plan To
Extend Climate Cap Raises Constitutional Questions, IN THE NEWS, July 19, 2006,
http://www.env.duke.edu/institute/news-neclimate.html (noting the key problem facing ROOf is
leakage from increased production in non-ROO! states for export to the regulated area).
26 For a discussion of different types of leakage, see Jonathan Baert Wiener, Protecting the Global
Environment, in RISK VERSUS RISK: TRAoEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 193,
214 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
27 See The Magnificent Seven, supra note 25; ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PROGRAM ON
TECH. INNOVATION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA CLIMATE INITIATIVES: AN INTEGRATED
APPROACH 3-15 (2007), http://www.epriweb.com/public/OOOOOOOOOOOIO 14641.pdf (estimating
leakage of up to eighty-two percent in response to California's climate change regulation).
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industry might be tempted to move to an area where costs are lower
because of less stringent regulations?8 The states in which firms re-Iocate
may choose to avoid or reduce the stringency of their regulations to attract
additional firms, thus exacerbating ·the leakage. Once relocated, industry
will have an incentive to keep the cost of production low and can be
expected to lobby against climate regulations. If many industries relocate
to one unregulated jurisdiction, they will likely constitute a more· powerful
anti-regulatory coalition there than before?9.
Leakage can reduce, and potentially even reverse, the effects of
proactive efforts wherever there are gaps in the geographic areas, fuels, or
industries that are regulated. Even global programs, like the Kyoto
Protocol, create the possibility of leakage when they do not cover all major
developed and developing nations.30
C. Climate Side Effects
In the rush to take action, policymakers have tended toward discrete,
politically popular plans, including greenhouse gas targets, energy
efficiency regulations, and renewable fuels standards. Yet when these
hastily adopted policies are not subjected to careful analysis, they can carry
with them the risk of unintended consequences.31 As now appears to be
the case with policies requiring or encouraging the expansion of biofuels,
some of these unintended consequences may- even exacerbate- the problem
of climate change itself.
Biofuels have played a major role in first-generation climate policies.
In the United States, biofuel incentives feature prominently in the federal
Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007,32 and have emerged in various state climate change policies.33
28 Wiener, supra note 8, at 1968.
29 See id, at 1972; see also Richard Schmalensee, Greenhouse Policy Architectures and
Institutions, in ECONOMICS AND POLICY ISSUES IN CLIMATE CHANGE 137, 146 (William D. Nordhaus
ed., 1998).
30 See Wiener, supra note 8, at 1967 ("Even the Kyoto Protoool is not sufliciently global. because
it omits emissions limits on the world's largest sources-the United States and China, as well as
Australia, India, Brazil, and others.").
3\ See Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global
Climate Policy: Issues of Design and Practicality, 9 ARIz. J. INT'L COMPo L. 83, 84 (1992) ("When
policy formulations hastily target one of many interrelated variables, they often ignore lower-cost
options to achieve better results and produce unintended side-effects that can confound the best-
intended policy.").
32 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-058, § 1501, 119 Stat. 1067-68 (amending
§ 211(0) of the Clean Air Act to require the use of renewable fuels); Energy Independence and Security
Act of2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 202, 121 Stat. 1521-1528 (same).
33 See, e.g., Alternative Fuels Incentive Act, 73 P.S. § 1647.1 (2004); Testimony on the Increased
Use of BiofUels, Governor Edward G. Rendell's PennSecurity Fuels Initiative: Hearing Before the
Pennsylvania S. Comm. on Environmental Resources & Energy (Sept. 19,2007) (statement of Dennis
C. Wolff, Pa. Sec'y of Dep't of Agriculture and Kathleen A. McGinty, Pa. Sec'y of Dep't. of Envtl.
Prot.), available at http://www.depweb.state.pa.us/dep/cwp/view.asp?a=3&q=529350; Press Release,
J
I
I
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They have also played a large role in the European Union's climate change
proposals, which relied on biofuels as the prim~ry means of limiting
greenhouse gases from the transportation sector.34 However, a recent re-
examination of biofuels has uncovered that not all ethanol is created equal.
Depending on whether producers of biofuels use diesel trucks, apply
nitrogen fertilizer, or plant where there once was rainforest, biofuels might
actually leave a negative carbon footprint. 35 In response to these
discoveries, the EU is now drafting legislation to ensure it encourages the
right kind of biofuels,36 yet the infrastructure for the wrong fuels has
already begun to take hold. Rainforests have been clear-cut and producers
have made the investments necessary to keep up with the estimated
demand.37 Even if EU and American authorities were to issue a
moratorium on carbon intensive or high footprint biofuels, the deforested
land and newly invigorated biofuel industry will not disappear. Producers
might simply seek out less environmentally conscious markets for these
alternative fuels. Although policymakers may well learn from this
experiment, the mistake's effects are not easilyundone.38
Governor Rendell Unveils Energy Independence Strategy to Save Consumers $10 Billion Over 10
Years, Reduce Reliance on Foreign Fuels (Feb. 1,2007), available at http://www.depweb.state.pa.us/
energindependent/lib/energindependent/docurnents/pr-020107.doc; State Ethanol Mandates Inching
Ahead, GREEN CAR CONGRESS, Mar. 20, 2006, http://www.greencarcongress.com/2006/03/state_
ethanol m.htrnl.
34James Kanter, Amid Doubts, Europe May Ban Some Biofuels, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 15,2008, at Cl,
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
35 See Jocelyn D'Ambrosio, Alternative Fuels: An Evaluation of Com Ethanol, Cellulosic
Ethanol, and Gasoline, 37 ENvrL. L, REp. 10615 (2007) (showing that use ofbiofuels could increase
net carbon output); Joseph Fargione et aI., Land Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon Debt, 319 SCIENCE
1235, 1237 (2008) (explaining that biofuels' ability to reduce emissions is directly related to how they
are produced); Jorn P.W. Scharlemann & William F. Laurance, How Green Are Biofuels?, 319
SCIENCE 43, 44 (2008) (finding that "[n]ot all biofuels are beneficial when their full environmental
impacts are assessed" and urging governments to be selective when encouraging their use); Michael
Grunwald, The Clean Energy Scam, TIME, Apr. 7, 2008, at 40-45 ("It turns out that the carbon lost
when wilderness is razed [for growing biofuel crops] overwhelms the gains from cleaner-burning
fuels."); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Studies Call Biofuels a Greenhouse Threat, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 29, 2008, at
A9, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File ("Almost all biofuels used today cause more
greenhouse gas emissions than conventional fuels if the full emissions costs of producing these 'green'
fuels are taken into account, two studies being published Thursday have concluded."); Robert Hahn &
Caroline Cecot, The Benefits and Costs of Ethanol (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr for Regulatory Studies
Working Paper No. 07-17,2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.clm?abstJ:acUd.=l02
7692 (showing that for ethanol fuel policies "costs are significantly higher than the total benefits").
36 Kanter, supra note 34.
37 Id
38 In light of the EU's experience, as well as the recent scientificrepons disclosing the fuels'
negative footprint, there is growing movement against biofuels in the United States. While Congress is
not yet rethinking the Renewable Fuel Standard in the 2007 Energy Act, environmentalists recently
sent a letter to the President and the Speaker of the House urging an ED-style revision. Rosenthal,
supra note 35; Biofuels Digest, Science Magazine Reaction: US Scientists Write to President Bush,
Speaker Pelosi; Berkeley Professor Says Recent Policy Decisions Moving in the Right Direction,
http://biofuelsdigest.com/blog2/2008/02/14/science-magazine-reaction-us-scientists-write-to-president-
bush-speaker-pelosi-berkeley-professor-says-recent-policy-decisions-moving-in-the~right-directionl
(Feb. 14,2008, 10:03 EST).
D. Other Side Effects
Not only can incremental policies generate side effects in terms of
climate change, they can create other side effects in terms of general health
and welfare.39 To reduce energy usage, for example, the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 requires light bulb manufacturers
to meet energy efficiency standards that currently can only be met with
compact fluorescent light bulbs.40 Yet compact fluorescent light bulbs
contain mercury.41 As such, broken or disposed of bulbs could cause
problems of mercury contamination. While producers claim the bulbs only
contain small amounts of mercury, the amount is enough to require special
disposal procedures.42 As the EPA cautions,. once a bulb is broken, the
user is supposed to don protective plastic gloves before collecting the
broken glass with stiff cardboard, not a broom or vacuum cleaner (which
could disperse the mercury).43 The user must seal the collected glass in
air-tight plastic bags before disposing of it.44 Because of the potential for
contamination, some states prohibit disposing of mercury-containing glass
in landfills.4s To remedy this problem, some manufacturers offer customers
the option of shipping the bulbs back to the factory, ,adding" of course, to
the carbon footprint.46 Even so, it is questionable whether all consumers
will take advantage of companies' return policies. Additional amounts of
mercury are likely to make their way into the nation's waste stream and
pose increased risks of mercury contamination. Although replacing
incandescent light bulbs can reduce energy demand and decrease
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39 Although we used biofuels in the preceding part to illustrate climate side effects, the production
of biofuels may cause other side effects as well, such as the depletion of water supplies or the creation
of water pollution. Ethanol and Water: Don't Mix, ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 2008, available at LEXIS,
News Library, ECON File; Brenda Goodman, Pollution Is Called a Byproduct ofa 'Clean' Fuel, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008, at A12, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
40 The standards require certain light bulbs to use twenty-five to thirty percent less energy than
today's products, beginning in 2012. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 110 Pub. L. No.
110-140, § 321, 121 Stat. 1573-87 (2007); see also Marianne Lavelle, FAQ: The Endofthe Light Bulb
as We Know It, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REpORT, Dec. 19,2007, available at LEXIS, News Library,
USNEWS File; ALLIANCE TO SAVE ENERGY, 2007 ENERGY BILL DETAILED SUMMARY 10 (2007),
http://www.ase.org/filesl4172_file_energy_bill_2007_summary.pdf.
41 See ENERGY STAR, EPA, FREQUENTLY AsKED QUESTIONS: INFORMATION ON COMPACT
FLUORESCENT LIGHT BULBS (CFLs) AND MERCURY (Feb. 2008), http://www.energystar.gov/ia/part
ners/promotions/change_light/downloadslFact_Sheet_Mercury.pdf ("Mercury currently is an essential
component of CFLs and is what allows the bulb to be an efficient light source.").
42 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Mercury: Spills, Disposal and Site Cleanup: What to
Do if a Fluorescent Light Bulb Breaks, http://www.epa.gov/mercury/spills/index.htm#fluorescent (last
visited Feb. 12,2008).
431d.
44Jd.
45 See id. ("Check with your local or state government about disposal requirements in your
specific area. Some states prohibit such trash disposal and require that broken and unbroken mercury-
containing bulbs be taken to a local recycling center."). '
46 Steven Mufson, Power Switch; The New Energy Law Will Change Light Bulbs, Appliances and
How We Save Electricity in the Home, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,2008, at FOt, available at LEXIS, News
Library, WPOST File.
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greenhouse gas emissions,47 in its zeal to focus on one environmental
problem, Congress has taken an incremental step that will likely add to
another environmental problem.48
In addition to the possibility of creating other environmental problems,
incremental climate change policies pose nontrivial economic risks. By
increasing energy costs, climate change policies can obviously induce
dramatic welfare and distributional effects.49 The widely expressed
concern that biofuel mandates have contributed to increases in global food
prices shows how climate policies may induce economic effects that spread
far beyond the price ofenergy.50
E. Lock-In
In addition to creating side effects, incremental policies can create a
path dependence that prevents or inhibits the development of better
alternatives.51 Implementing, monitoring, and maintaining any policy
requires start-up costs, making it harder to change policies mid-stream.52
47 The EPA estimates that replacing incandescent light bulbs with compact fluorescent bulbs
could "save enough energy to light more than 3 million homes for a year, more than $600 million in
annual energy costs, and prevent greenhouse gases equivalent to the emissions of more than 800,000
cars." Energy Star, Compact Fluorescent Light Bulbs, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfin?
c=cfls.pr_cfls (last visited Mar. 24,2(08).
48 To its credit, Congress at least recognized this potential side effect and called for the
Department of Energy and the EPA to prepare for Congress within one year "a report describing
recommendations relating to the means by which the Federal Government may reduce or prevent the
release ofmerc~during the manufacture, transportation, storage, or disposal of light bulbs." Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 1l0-140, § 32 I (h) (2007).
49 One study estimated that abating 3.0 gigatons of annual GHG emissions in the United States by
2030 would entail capital investments of $50 billion annually (excluding operating expenses).
MCKINSEY & Co., THE CONFERENCE BOARD, REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: How
MUCH AT WHAT COST? 26 (2007), http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsilpdflUS~g_final_
report.pdf. To put a 3.0 gigaton reduction into context, consider that pending federal legislative
proposals would aim to achieve reductions roughly on the order of 3.5 to 5.2 gigatons by 2030. Id. at
17. The capital costs would be "highly concentrated in the power and transportation sectors" and
would result in "the likelihood of upward pressure on rates and vehicle prices." Id. at 26; see also
CHAD STONE & MATT FIELDER, CTR. BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE-
CHANGE POLICIES ON THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE BUDGETS OF LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 7-8 (2008), http://www.cbpp.org/l0-24-07climate.pdf (analyzing the potential
economic and distributional impacts of climate change policies).
50 See, e.g., Mark Clayton, As Global Food Costs Rise, Are Biofuels to Blame?, CHRIsTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 28, 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0128/p03s03-usec.html (quoting Siwa
Msangi of the International Food Policy Research Institute that "[m]ore people are coming to the
conclusion that there is a food-fuel link"); National Public Radio, World Bank Chief" Biojitels Boosting
Food Prices, Morning Edition, Apr. II, 2008, www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=8954
5855 (quoting World Bank President Robert Zoellick that demand for biofuels has been a "significant
contributor" to increases in global food prices).
51 See Stewart & Wiener, supra note 31, at 98 ("Experience shows that, once adopted, piecemeal
initiatives rarely evolve into a comprehensive strategy.").
52 See Schulman, supra note 19, at 1356 ("Nonincremental policies in particular must expand
greatly if they are to expand at all. Only then can they overcome the inertia, external resistance, or
internal start-up problems which act as barriers to policy expansion.").
The learning required to work within any new policy framework makes the
regulated entities (and regulators) less likely to favor changing to an
unfamiliar approach. When legislators and voters think an issue has
already been addressed, it requires a lot of political heavy lifting to change
established policies. And perhaps most importantly, those who have an
interest in the status quo under an incremental policy can be expected to
resist policy change-including the regulators, the regulated companies
that make compliance investments, and the advocates of the initial
. 1 h 53Incrementa approac es.
The biofuels saga shows that those who make investments in response
to a new policy, such as biofuels producers, have an interest in continuing
to market their products. Companies that have built expensive ethanol
distilleries, for example, will not readily abandon their investments for
different technologies. Nor can it be expected that politicians will eagerly
want to force ethanol producers to shut down operations that both employ
thousands of constituents and address, if only symbolically, a pressing
environmental problem.54 Consequently, as Jeff Bingaman, Chair of the
U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, noted in
commenting on the federal Renewable Fuel Standard, "there is little room
in the RFS for technological advance.',55
The factors that contribute to policy lock-in can also inhibit national
efforts to displace the patchwork of state climate change policies and
programs. As Carlarne notes, over the past decade there have been 189 .
efforts by states, including eight regional compacts, to reduce global
warming.56 Although many suggest we can learn from these state
experiments, perhaps modelling a national response on some of these .
efforts, legal scholar Jonathan Wiener reminds us that "the flip side of
experimentation is that a proliferation of different GHG policies and.
allowance markets in different states-and across countries-may generate
conflicting approaches and vested interests that are difficult to reconcile
and mesh in a larger national or international regime.,,57 The sheer number
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53 ROBERT REPETTO, NATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY: CHOOSING THE RlGHT ARCHITECTURE Pt. C
(2007), available at http://www.climateactionproject.com/docs/Repetto.pd£
54 Cf Grunwald, supra note 35, at 44. Of course, we recognize that Congress and state
legislatures could still retreat from their policies promoting renewable fuels. and perhaps one or more
of these institutions will. Our point is simply that doing so will not be easy.
55 Press Release, U.S. Senate Corom. on Energy & Natural Res., Bingaman on RFS Effects on
Energy Markets (Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://energy.senate.gov/ (follow "More Democratic
News" hyperlink; then follow "Bingaman on RFS Effects on Energy Marlcets" hyperlink).
56 See Carlarne, supra note 1, at 1365 (noting that "forty-two states have greenhouse gas
inventories; twenty-nine states have adopted climate action plans; fourteen states have adopted
greenhouse gas emission targets; thirteen states are in the process of adopting greenhouse gas emission
standards for automobiles; six states have mandatory greenhouse gas reporting programs; twenty states
have formed climate change advisory boards; ... twenty-five states are participating in one or more of
eight existing regional climate change initiatives" and "sixteen states have public benefit funds for
clean energy supply[] and twenty-four states have renewable energy portfolio standards").
57 Wiener, supra note 8, at 1974.
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of climate change efforts, with every state having some climate change
policy or law, suggests that displacing them at the national or global level
will notbe easy.58
F. Lulling
Finally, incremental policies may lull the' public into thinking climate
change is being addressed, thus dampening demand for the costly and
comprehensive policies that will achieve the most meaningful results. In
the wake of a proliferation of incremental policies, comprehensive
solutions must gamer additional support in order to overcome bias toward
the status quo.
Alternatively, since incremental policies are inherently less effective in
addressing global problems, the failures of incremental climate change
policies might breed increased cynicism about whether any policy solution
can work. When small commitments fail to produce large policy pay-offs,
policies can become harder, not easier, to expand.59 Moreover, because the
risks of climate change are not yet palpable6°-there has been no massive
coastline loss, for example-the necessity of more comprehensive action
might not be immediately obvious.
III. TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
The perils of incrementalism in the face of climate change are certainly
not inconsequential. Despite the evident support for piecemeal climate
change policies, policymakers should carefully consider the types of harms
we have outlined whenever they are confronted with proposals for ad hoc
state or national prescriptions. Given the risks of error in climate change
policy, it will almost certainly be better to pass on adopting piecemeal
policies today to wait to develop alternative, comprehensive policies less
prone to the types of perils we have outlined.
Ironically, some of the perils of incrementalism stem from the very
policymaking constraint that incrementalism is designed to help overcome:
limited information.61 We agree that this constraint is real.62 Indeed, that
58 See David Hodas, State Initiatives, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 343, 343
(Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007) ("As of July 2006, every state in the country has adopted some sort of
law or policy to address climate change.").
59 See Schulman, supra note 19, at 1366 (arguing that once a policy has overcome the initial
hurdles of passage and implementation, "[w]ithout major mobilizing commitments (sucb as landing a
man on the moon and returning him safely) these policies simply cannot generate and sustain the
support required for their collective payoffs").
.60 Cf Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the
Environmental Movement, ISO U. PA. L. REv. 85, 88 (2001) (contrasting the "tangible environmental
problems" addressed by early environmental legislation with the "less palpable" problem of climate
change).
61 For a discussion of limited information as a basis for an incrementalist approach, see mprcr
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is precisely why policymakers should take the time needed to develop
more comprehensive climate change responses, gathering more
information and conducting more careful analyses. Rather than adopting a
series of ad hoc, piecemeal policies and trying eventually to learn
something through trial and error, the better way in this context is to invest
additional time and resources up front in policy analysis and robust
deliberation, so as to increase the probability of maximizing policy
effectiveness and minimizing side effects and policy failures. Of course,
we also recognize that waiting forever is not an optimal strategy. The
challenge is to design a comprehensive policy response that is both
manageable and does not demand omniscience of policYmakers.
An upstream cap-and-trade policy is an example of the type of
comprehensive policy that would fare better than the mYriad piecemeal
reforms under way and would be well worth closer inspection by
policYmakers.63 Such a policy would be best implemented.globally, ina
way that covers all nations and all greenhouse gases, but even a cap-and-
trade policy at the national level in the United States would be better than
the uncoordinated status quo. Under a domestic upstream cap-and-trade
approach, the federal government would establish a national cap on the
production and sale of carbon-based and other GHG fuels, but would allow
energy companies to trade and bank fuel allowances. As described in a
recent policy analysis by economist Robert Stavins, such a comprehensive
upstream cap-and-trade would encompass the entire economy, phase in
caps over time to allow for planning and encourage innovation, and would
accommodate uncertainties by allowing banking and trading as well as by
using multi-year compliance periods.64
Capping fuels upstream has several advantages. Perhaps most
importantly, it is administratively feasible, while capping emissions
"downstream" is not, due to the millions of emissions sources that would
need to be monitored. In addition, because a comprehensive upstream cap-
and-trade would cover the entire economy, it would prevent leakage in a
way that piecemeal approaches cannot.65 Yet as with piecemeal
approaches, an upstream cap-and-trade recognizes that central
policYmakers lack full information. The flexibility built into a cap-and-
62 See Cary Coglianese et aI., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory
Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REv. 277, 277 (2004) (noting that "information is the lifeblood of
regulatory policy").
63 Our discussion of an upstream cap-and-trade policy in this part of the article illustrates simply
one promising policy we think would be less prone to the perils of incrementalism we have highlighted
in this article. Given space constraints, our discussion clearly does not reflect the type of
comprehensive policy analysis that should precede selection of a cap-and-trade proposal or any other
policy over other potential alternatives, such fuel or emissions taxes.
64 ROBERT N. STAVINS, A U.S. CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM TO ADDRESS GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE 14 (2007), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/lOclimate stavins/lO
c1imate_stavins.pdf. - -
65Id. at 18-19.
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trade system gives private actors, who have better information, the ability
and the incentive to find new ways to adapt to fuel constraints.
To be sure, private actors might respond to the flexibility of a cap-and-
trade system by adopting technologies that pose new kinds of risks.66 For
example, one could easily imagine market actors converting the nation's
lighting to fluorescent light bulbs, with the same kind of side effects that
would result from a focally incremental prescription imposed by a central
policymaker. As such, vigilance will still be needed. Policy makers need
to continue to monitor for such side effects from the introduction of unsafe
products. But these side effects will be easier to address through ordinary
regulatory oversight of market activities because they would arise from
market innovation rather than_legislative prescription. Unsafe technologies
that are "locked-in" by legislation require new legislation to address them;
such technologies introduced by private actors require only responsive
action by regulatory agencies charged with administering their normal
safety missions.
Lulling will be less of a concern too. Once there is support for a
comprehensive cap-and-trade program, the regulated firms themselves
determine and implement their own response, without the 'fieed for building
additional public support. By designing the system to include increasingly
more stringent limits over time on the production and sale of carbon-based
and other ORO fuels, an upstream cap-and-trade system would continually
give economic actors the incentive to search for better solutions.
Although a coordinated approach like an upstream cap-and-trade
regime will better avoid the perils associated with incrementalism, we can
imagine several responses from adherents of incrementalism and
democratic experimentalism. First, some incrementalists might fully
support an upstream cap-and-trade, but nevertheless argue that the current
incrementalist path is the only (or the quickest) way to see it
implemented.67 Current ad hoc policies, it might be suggested, both signal
intense public demand for a response to climate change and also change
the political dynamic in Washington. Under this view, as disjointed
policies proliferate, industry can be expected to support a centralized
approach over the minefield of diffuse, ad hoc policies. Despite the
plausibility of this argument, we find it unconvincing for reasons we have
already discussed, such as the countervailing lock-in effect.68 Moreover,
taking more action at the state level hardly seems necessary to generate
66 For a discussion of the risks that can arise in response to an upstream cap-and-trade system, see
David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty Input Limits, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2009), SSRN manuscript at 38-40, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.
cfm? abstract id=1102299).
67 See Engel, supra note 2, at 1564-65 (arguing that state-initiated climate change litigation is
likely to be just as effective if not more effective than positive regulation and that third-party GHG
emissions offsets can function well until a federal regulatory program is adopted).
68 See supra Part II.E.
1428 CONNECTICUTLAWREVIEW [VoL 40:1411
additional support for comprehensive federal legislation. It is hard to
imagine climate change gaining more prominence on the political agenda
in Washington or climate change policies eliciting more political support
than they have right now. National policYmakers no longer debate the
question of whether climate change is a problem. Indeed, candidates from
both parties in pursuit of the White House in 2008 have pledged to address
climate change.69 Because those in Washington, the public, and industry
are already clamoring for a defmitive response, each additional incremental
response will bring only marginally more pressure on the center-and as
we have suggested, incremental responses can also quite likely to
undermine further action if the public becomes lulled into thinking the
problem is getting solved through numerous ad hoc responses.70
Second, incrementalists might object that it is risky to do nothing while
waiting for a comprehensive cap-and-trade solution, since support for such
a solution might never materialize, even under the most supportive
political conditions. Incrementalists might argue that piecemeal state
policies, even if some of the policies are largely symbolic, at least
represent something-and something is better than nothing.71 Yet an
incremental "something" is hardly appealing if it locks in ineffective
programs that will be difficult to displace.72 Furthermore, side effects from
myopic policies, either on climate change or other societal concerns, can
set back progress, sometimes significantly.73 When scientists predict that
the catastrophic effects of global warming loom just over the horizon, there
is little time to learn and adjust in response to the trials and errors of
incremental experiments.74
69 See Hillary for President, Powering America's Future: HiJlary Clinton's Plan to Address the
Energy and Climate Crisis, http://www.hillaryciinton.com/files/pdfJpoweringamericasfuture.pdf (last
visited May 22, 2008); McCain, Climate Change, http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/Issues/
daI51alc-733a-4dc1-9cd3-f9caScabalde.htm (last visited May 22, 2008); Obama '08, Energy &
Environment, http://www.barackobama.comlissues/energy/ (last visited May 22,2008); see also Scott
Horsley, 2008 Election Issues: Climate Change, NPR, Jan. 30, 2008, http://www.npr.org/news/
specials/election2008/issues/c1imate.html (mapping the candidates' approach to climate change).
70 See supra Part II.F.
71 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1458 (2007) (reasoning that concerns over the
potential ineffectiveness of a motor vehicle emission standard are unfounded because any "reduction in
domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens
elsewhere").
72 See Wiener, supra note 8, at 1974 (explaining that while experiments might be helpful, if the
state policies are not compatible, experiments might also "generate conflicting approaches and vested
interests that are difficult to reconcile and mesh in a larger national or international regime").
73 See supra Parts lI.C-D.
74 One interim step that can always be taken-and probably should have been taken years ago for
climate change-would be to adopt information collection policies that would generate data helpful to
policymakers, both in selecting a comprehensive policy and later in providing a basis for evaluation of
subsequently adopted substantive policies. For example, the fmal provision in Division A, Title II of
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 calls for EPA to "require mandatory reporting of
greenhouse gas emissions above appropriate thresholds in all sectors of the economy' of the United
States." Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2128 (2008).
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CONCLUSION
Although it may seem to take more time to develop an effective,
coordinated system than to adopt piecemeal approaches, the total time to
make meaningful improvements in climatic conditions may prove to be
less than if we continue to proceed on a piecemeal basis. Settling on a
comprehensive solution through trial-and-error will demand significant
time due to the need to evaluate and adjust incremental policies. A better
alternative appears to be analyzing and building support for a
comprehensive, upstream cap-and-trade that is able to achieve some of the
benefits of incrementalism by allowing market actors some flexibility, but
without falling prey to many of the perils of incrementalism.
State experimentation has been described as one of the great hallmarks
of the U.S. democracy.75 However, with respect to climate change, there is
good reason to doubt the appropriateness of the current ad hoc, state and
local responses to this global. problem. At their most benign, current
incremental reforms will have little or no effect on climate change. Yet at
the worst, leakage from unregulated areas can undermine the reductions
made in more policy active states. As we have illustrated with the
examples of the biofuel and light bulb mandates, side effects can
exacerbate climate change problems or create other public health problems.
Furthermore, disjointed experimentation can entrench interests and lull the
public into thinking progress is being made, thus making comprehensive
policymaking more challenging to achieve. Under these circumstances, it
appears better to wait to develop a comprehensive and effective climate
change policy rather than to continue succumbing to pressure to adopt
incremental options that will ultimately prove ineffective or otherwise
problematic.
75 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(arguing that both the framers of the Constitution and the states intended for states to be able to adapt
and experiment to coincide with "progress").
